Germany’s debate over the Future Combat Air System is no longer just about technology or budgets; it has become a test of whether Europe can still act together on high-end defense projects. Former Airbus chief executive Tom Enders has emerged as a prominent voice warning Berlin that a solo fighter jet path would fracture that effort and weaken Europe’s position in a far more dangerous world. His criticism of national detours and of growing enthusiasm for the American F-35 reflects a broader struggle between transatlantic dependence and European industrial sovereignty.
Enders argues that fragmentation would not only waste money but also slow innovation at a moment when armed drones, networked “combat clouds” and artificial intelligence are reshaping warfare. By urging Germany to stick with FCAS and resist a purely national fighter program, he is effectively calling on Europe’s largest economy to decide whether it wants to be a driver of joint capability or a premium export customer for others.
Tom Enders’ warning and the FCAS fault line
Tom Enders built his reputation steering Airbus through a period of intense competition in civil aviation and complex defense projects, which gives his intervention in the FCAS debate particular weight. As a former Airbus CEO Tom, he has repeatedly argued that large European programs only succeed when governments resist the temptation to renationalize design and production. His warning to Germany is that a national fighter initiative, even if framed as a “backup” to FCAS, would quickly siphon off funding, engineers and political attention from the joint project with France and Spain.
Consistent with his long-standing push for Europe to think and act at scale, his comments on FCAS follow a familiar pattern. In earlier remarks on defense technology, he stressed that European industry must move faster on armed robots and autonomous systems if it wants to keep pace with global competitors, a point he illustrated while arriving at an Airbus event in Blagnac near Toulouse to discuss future capabilities for Airbus. For FCAS, his core message is similar: fragmentation into national projects would not create more capability; it would dilute the European effort just as the technological race accelerates.
European cooperation versus national fighter projects
Enders’ critique of a German-only fighter sits in a wider argument about how Europe organizes its defense industry. He has previously cautioned that when governments micromanage industrial programs or carve them up along national lines, the result is slower development and higher costs. In one interview he warned that political interference in a major European fighter programme risked repeating past mistakes where work shares were driven by domestic politics instead of engineering logic. For FCAS, he sees the same danger if Berlin were to hedge with a national design that competes for resources rather than reinforcing the joint architecture.
The industrial logic behind FCAS is to pool expertise across borders, from airframes and engines to sensors and data links, instead of maintaining parallel production lines in several countries. That approach has already produced spin-off benefits, such as the French Navy’s decision to buy more surveillance drones from Airbus Defense, which links naval needs with aerospace know-how and shows how cross-border cooperation can feed into programs like the Aliaca system for the French Navy. A purely German fighter project would move in the opposite direction, limiting economies of scale and making it harder to integrate new unmanned platforms and “combat cloud” concepts that FCAS is supposed to deliver.
F-35 controversy and Enders’ call for distance from the USA
The FCAS debate in Germany is unfolding alongside a heated argument over the American F-35, and Tom Enders has not been shy about where he stands. In a widely discussed intervention he was quoted with the blunt line that “Nobody needs an F-35,” a remark that captured his frustration with European governments that buy off-the-shelf American jets instead of investing in their own industrial base. His comments came as the debate over the procurement of the American fighter intensified, with After Portugal and Canada both questioning their own F-35 purchases and raising doubts about the long-term wisdom of locking in a system built around the number 35. For Enders, each such deal pulls Europe further away from the scale needed to sustain its own programs.
Across Germany and Europe, the F-35 question has become a proxy for a deeper strategic choice. Reporting from one debate describes how discussion of a potential withdrawal from the US F-35 fighter jet program has heated up in Germany, with critics pointing to rising costs and a growing bill that runs into the billions for a system centered on the figure 35. Enders’ argument is that every euro spent on such imports is a euro not invested in FCAS or in the supporting unmanned systems and digital infrastructure that would make a European sixth-generation fighter viable. By urging “more distance from the USA” in this context, he is not calling for a break with Washington, but for a more balanced relationship in which Europe can field its own high-end combat aircraft instead of relying almost entirely on American designs.
Armed robots, drones and the next generation of airpower
Enders’ warnings about a German national fighter program are closely tied to his broader push for Europe to accelerate work on armed robots and autonomous systems. In a recent intervention he argued that Europe was moving too slowly on these technologies and risked falling behind both the United States and other powers if it did not launch a fast and coordinated effort to build armed robots. He pointed to the striking image of the U.S. voting with China and Russia in the UN Security Council on a sensitive issue as a sign that Europe could no longer assume automatic alignment with Washington on every strategic question. For him, that episode underlined the need for Europeans to be able to defend their interests with their own advanced systems.
Within FCAS, unmanned platforms and loyal wingman drones are not add-ons but central pillars, intended to work in swarms with a manned fighter and share data through highly secure networks. The French Navy’s acquisition of additional Airbus Defense surveillance drones, which support operations from the sea and link back to shore-based command centers, offers a concrete example of how European forces are already integrating unmanned systems into daily practice through surveillance drones. Enders’ concern is that a national German fighter project would likely focus on a classic manned aircraft first and treat these unmanned elements as secondary, whereas FCAS is designed from the outset as a system of systems that blends crewed and uncrewed platforms.
Strategic autonomy, EU politics and the cost of fragmentation
The FCAS dispute also touches directly on the European Union’s ambitions for “strategic autonomy,” a concept that has gained traction in Brussels as security threats multiply. An official briefing from the European Commission on defense and security cooperation in Germany and Europe, discovered through the Harici coverage of the F-35 debate, highlights how EU leaders have framed joint capability projects as a way to reduce dependence on external suppliers, especially in areas like the number 35 fighter segment. Enders’ call for Germany to avoid a national fighter path aligns with that agenda, since FCAS is one of the flagship efforts meant to anchor a more integrated European defense industrial base.
His broader criticism of political micromanagement in aerospace goes beyond FCAS itself. Years earlier, when asked about another major fighter initiative, he cautioned that constant government interference in a European program could stifle innovation and delay delivery, a warning captured in his remarks on European defense projects. The same logic applies to Berlin’s current choices: if Germany splits its bets between FCAS, F-35 imports and a possible national fighter, it risks ending up with overlapping fleets, higher lifecycle costs and less leverage in both NATO and EU negotiations. For Enders, the alternative is clear: a focused European effort that keeps Germany firmly inside FCAS, channels investment into shared technologies like drones and armed robots, and treats national prestige projects as a luxury Europe can no longer afford.
